# The Ground Station Gap: Why Arctic Space Power Runs Through Norway **By:** Small Wars Journal **Published:** 2026-08-31T21:11:40.000+00:00 **Source:** [Small Wars Journal](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ground-station-gap-why-arctic-space-power-runs-through-gel9e) --- Advancing the discourse at the speed of relevance. A Changing Arctic Over the last few decades, global warming has affected the Arctic more than any other region, with its eastern parts warming at nearly four times the global average. Because of higher temperatures and less ice, the Arctic has become easier to access and more contested, as retreating ice opens shipping lanes and seabed resources that have long been out of reach. As a result, there has become increased attention on the region, especially from Russia and China. Russia has invested heavily along its Arctic coast and rebuilt several old Soviet bases, mainly to secure the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which cuts shipping time from Asia to Europe by around 40 percent. It now operates 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, 16 deep-water ports, and more than 40 icebreakers. Russia has also become increasingly assertive in the region, from placing a flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 2007 to pressing more expansive claims over Arctic governance. China has taken a different approach. Beijing announced its Polar Silk Road project in 2018 and declared itself a “near-Arctic state.” The label carries no formal weight in international law but is a clear signal of Chinese intentions in the Arctic. China has also invested heavily in Arctic research stations, such as the Yellow River Station on Svalbard and the China-Iceland Arctic Observatory at Kárhóll, and in 2025, deployed five icebreakers to the Arctic at once for the first time. These Arctic capabilities are important and have strengthened both Russia’s and China’s position in the region. Still, without polar-orbiting satellites, which circle the planet from pole to pole, they are vulnerable. That is why Russia has built space-based tools such as satellite reconnaissance, secure communications, and targeting support into its Arctic operations. At the same time, China has expanded its polar satellite program, from the Ice Pathfinder, a wide-view imaging satellite with a field of view larger than NASA’s or the ESA’s equivalents, to a planned synthetic-aperture radar constellation that can see through clouds and long polar nights to monitor the Northern Sea Route. As activity in the Arctic grows, competition for influence and military advantage increasingly plays out in the space domain, where satellites provide everything from convoy routing, the organizing of ships, to missile warnings. However, the space domain runs through ground infrastructure at high latitudes, stations, launch sites, antennas, and radar that bring all the data down to Earth. As Rolf Skatteboe, the former CEO of Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT) said, without ground stations, satellites are just “space junk.” The United States faces a high-latitude ground-station gap in the Arctic that more money cannot close. Norway already operates the launch sites, ground stations, and radar that polar-orbiting satellites depend on, and no other ally has that full capability. A dedicated agreement under the Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) would put infrastructure to work for American operations in the Arctic. US Positioning For decades, American Arctic strategy has lagged behind, giving Russia and China time to build up their presence in the region. The result is that the United States has one major base above the Arctic Circle, the Pituffik Space Base in Greenland, three operational icebreakers in the Coast Guard fleet, and limited high-latitude ground station capability. The United States relies on a small number of antennas concentrated around Fairbanks in interior Alaska at 65°N, plus a single Arctic Circle site at Utqiagvik at 72°N. Fairbanks sits below the Arctic Circle, meaning antennas miss the highest passes, making Utqiagvik the only site with true polar reach. That poses a problem when polar-orbiting satellites are used for essentially everything the US military does in the region, such as communications, navigation, missile warning, command and control, and search and rescue. This is not a money problem. The FY2026 Space Force budget request totals roughly $40 billion when reconciliation funding, money added through the congressional budget process, is included. That is more than double the $15.4 billion Congress appropriated in FY2021. The Pentagon’s 2024 Arctic Strategy acknowledges that the constraints are geographic. It states that due to limited legacy satellite coverage, the Department of Defense should improve tactical and strategic communications north of 65°N by pursuing technology through commercial partners and agreements with NATO allies and partners. Click here to read the remainder of this essay in Small Wars Journal! The essay continues as follows: Norway as a Solution Why Isn’t a Partnership Further Along? Building an Effective Partnership Conclusion Attend the 2026 Future Security Forum, co-hosted by Small Wars Journal.