# "Narco Drone Wars": Mapping Armed Drone Proliferation Across Latin American Criminal Organizations **By:** Miguel Santos García **Published:** 2026-11-10T13:16:37+00:00 **Source:** [Global Research](https://www.globalresearch.ca/armed-drone-proliferation-latin-american-criminal-organizations/5945447) --- ### The criminal drone problem in Latin America is no longer an emerging trend but a consolidated operational reality... ![](https://www.globalresearch.ca/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/drone-400x246.jpeg) **_The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems among [criminal](https://insightcrime.org/news/drones-fuel-criminal-arms-race-latin-america/) and armed non-state groups across Latin America has accelerated at a pace that now outpaces the doctrinal and technological adaptation of the region’s security forces, producing a heterogeneous but rapidly converging threat landscape that demands systematic mapping and assessment._** What began as an extension of established [smuggling](https://www.businessinsider.com/how-mexicos-cartels-are-using-drugs-for-attacks-drug-smuggling-2021-5) logistics has matured into a weaponized capability employed for surveillance, coercion, and lethal attack, with criminal organizations drawing directly on battlefield experience from the US proxy war against Russia in Ukraine to compress the learning curve that would otherwise have taken years to traverse. **Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil constitute the principal theaters examined here, while Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, and Costa Rica display dangerous but less extensively documented use patterns.** . ![](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!AQDF!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4eade820-b20a-4010-bffd-b0bb8e8ce892_5135x5797.png) Use of drones by criminals (Red: states with the highest usage; Yellow: states with less extensive use) [Source](https://miguelsantosgarc.substack.com/p/mapping-armed-drone-proliferation) . ## **The Narco Drone Wars** A United States government assessment has concluded that the continued exploitation of individuals with recent combat experience in Ukraine is of chief concern, warning that counternarcotics authorities in both the United States and Mexico are dangerously unprepared for the challenges this shift will pose, as a Washington Post review of the assessment [reported](https://www.adn.com/nation-world/2026/09/22/drug-cartels-are-making-alarming-drone-advances-us-assessment-warns/). Mexican intelligence officials have acknowledged deepening concern about the [proliferation](https://www.borderreport.com/hot-topics/us-mexico-to-step-up-fight-against-cartel-drones/) of large drones capable of hauling explosives and contraband, with at least one cartel possessing aircraft featuring six to eight propellers that permit hours-long flights and payloads approaching one hundred fifty pounds, while another organization has sent personnel to [China](https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/the-looming-threat-chinese-civilian-drones-in-latin-america/) to purchase drones that can later be modified and equipped with weapons, according to Mexican authorities cited in the same reporting. Colombian drone specialists returning from Ukraine are reportedly offered large sums of money and brought to Mexico to train groups of _droneros_, a development that signals the emergence of a transnational market for weaponized aerial expertise that is no longer confined to any single national theater, as a Mexican official [told](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/09/22/us-assessment-warns-drug-cartels-alarming-drone-advances/) the Washington Post. Mexico constitutes the most mature and quantitatively documented theater of criminal drone operations in the hemisphere, with the Secretariat of National Defense recording six hundred five explosive drone attacks between 2020 and mid-2023, rising from five in 2020 to approximately two hundred sixty in the first half of 2023 alone, according to [figures compiled](https://smallwarsjournal.com/2026/07/16/hybrid-violence-in-mexico-cartel-attacks-tactical-evolution-and-the-impact-of-2025-terrorist-designations/) by the Mexican defense secretariat. The year 2024 saw seventy-seven drone attacks launched by transnational criminal organizations in Mexico, more than double the previous year, a figure that analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies have [described](https://www.ksn.com/border-report-tour/cartel-drone-attacks-growing-exponentially-in-mexico-colombia/) as part of an exponential increase in drone bombings across the region. The year 2025 marked the normalization of drone warfare as systems were fully integrated into [cartel doctrine](https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/01/world/americas/mexico-cartel-weapons.html), with specialized units adapting inexpensive commercial drones for bombing and battlefield reconnaissance while some groups developed rudimentary counter-drone measures. The Jalisco New Generation Cartel and allied groups in Michoacán employed drones to dropping explosive payloads into populated areas, often at night, and used these systems for surveillance and targeting that enabled coordinated ground attacks, a pattern that matured from experimentation into routine operational use including kamikaze-style drones. A coordinated drone attack struck the Baja California Attorney General’s Office in Tijuana in October 2025, with three drones carrying homemade explosives targeting the anti-kidnapping unit in an incident that Reuters [described](https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/crude-drone-attack-hits-mexican-govt-office-tijuana-no-deaths-or-injuries-2025-10-16/) as a makeshift drone attack on the state attorney general’s offices. The assimilation of fiber-optic drone technology, originally developed in the Ukraine-Russia conflict, into Mexican cartel operations has been [documented](https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2026/10/18/drones-de-fibra-optica-la-tecnologia-de-la-guerra-de-ucrania-y-rusia-que-llego-a-los-carteles-mexicanos/), with Mexican security sources intercepting communications between cartel members who wished to bring wired drones resistant to counter-drone systems into the country. The procurement of commercial drones capable of carrying grenades and improvised explosives has become routine, with platforms acquired online for as little as three thousand to ten thousand Brazilian reais in the case of Brazil and comparable sums elsewhere, [according to reporting](https://jornaldebrasilia.com.br/noticias/brasil/uso-de-drones-com-bombas-pelo-comando-vermelho-expoe-escalada-belica-do-crime-organizado/) on Brazilian faction procurement. Brazil presents a distinct but convergent trajectory in which the Comando Vermelho and the Primeiro Comando da Capital have incorporated drones armed with explosives into their operational repertoire, most visibly during the October 2025 Rio de Janeiro police operation that [resulted](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/28/brazil-rio-at-war-police-drug-raids-favelas) in sixty-four deaths and in which the Comando Vermelho [responded](https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2025/10/29/police-operation-against-comando-vermelho-leaves-at-least-64-dead-becoming-the-deadliest-in-rios-history/) to the police offensive by deploying drones adapted to drop explosives on security forces and civilians in the Penha complex. The tactics employed by these factions replicate strategies observed in the conflicts in Ukraine and the Gaza Strip, revealing a new stage of sophistication that includes thermographic cameras for monitoring the movement of targets and, in some cases, rudimentary anti-drone equipment acquired by factions seeking protection from rival group attacks. The equipment used is typically commercial first-person view drones, easily purchased over the internet, and while simple in construction these platforms are capable of transporting payloads of up to half a kilogram, sufficient to carry a hand grenade. The criminal organization Primeiro Comando da Capital has [integrated](https://www.aei.org/commentary/brazils-primeiro-comando-da-capital-pcc-takes-flight/) drones and geolocation equipment into its monitoring of targets marked for death and has used drones and thermographic cameras to monitor riverine police posts in the Amazon, while a Federal Police operation in September 2024 [arrested](https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2024/09/16/pf-prende-cabo-da-marinha-por-operar-drones-lancadores-de-granadas-para-o-cv.htm) a Navy serviceman accused of assisting the Comando Vermelho in adapting aerial equipment and teaching traffickers to use a device that holds a grenade and releases the pin at the moment of discharge. Colombia represents the most intense and geographically dispersed drone threat environment in the region, with the Ministry of Defense [confirming](https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/en-2025-se-presentaron-8395-ataques-con-drones-mindefensa-ante-plenaria-del-senado/) eight thousand three hundred ninety-five drone attacks in 2025 that left twenty people dead and two hundred ninety-seven wounded, although only four percent of these attacks, equivalent to three hundred thirty-three events, were effective. The principal perpetrators are structures of the National Liberation Army and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia linked to aliases Iván Mordisco and Calarcá, and the attacks have concentrated in the departments of Cauca, Nariño, and Valle del Cauca, followed by the Catatumbo region, which accounted for seven percent of events. In [Colombia](https://qz.com/colombia-drone-attacks-armed-groups-civilians-2025-061526), Armed Conflict Location and Event Data [recorded](https://acleddata.com/media-citation/drones-reshape-war-colombia-deaths-and-injuries-mount-guardian) only one such attack in 2023 but thirty-eight in 2024 and one hundred forty-nine in 2025, while Colombia’s Ministry of Defense reported sixty-one attacks in 2024 and three hundred thirty-three effective attacks in 2025, with drones used in twelve municipalities in 2024 and forty-one in 2025, a geographical spread that a senior analyst described as concerning not only because of the rapid escalation and frequency of use but also because of its expansion beyond traditional conflict zones. By 2025 it is believed that almost all major armed groups in Colombia were using militarized drones, with attacks targeting police and army patrols as well as rival armed groups, and between 2024 and 2025 a sharp rise was recorded in drone attacks affecting civilians. The Colombian National Army [activated](https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/the-rise-of-drones-in-the-fight-against-organized-crime-in-latin-america/) Latin America’s first Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Battalion in October 2025, headquartered in the Boyacá department and comprising four specialized companies integrating artificial intelligence and aerial attack capabilities, a milestone that reflects the recognition that control of airspace has become a decisive factor in counternarcotics and counter-organized-crime operations. Ecuador and Peru exhibit a distinct but related pattern in which criminal drone use is closely tied to prison systems, border control, and the logistics of transnational [drug trafficking](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/drug-cartels-are-adopting-cutting-edge-drone-technology-heres-how-the-us-must-adapt/), with a drone loaded with forty pounds of explosives [striking](https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article288701245.html) the roof of La Roca maximum-security prison in Ecuador in September 2024 in an apparent attempt to trigger a mass escape. Peruvian authorities [intercepted](https://delpais.com.pe/apec-2024-soldados-derriban-35-drones-con-armamento-especializado-en-la-cumbre/) 35 drone threats during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima that same year, and the Chone Killers and associated groups have [deployed](https://www.ecuavisa.com/noticias/seguridad/duran-policia-decomiso-arsenal-chone-killers-bodega-BF1849206) drones to drop explosive devices on adversaries, with Ecuadorian police seizing drones and explosives from Chone Killers arsenals in Durán. Argentina has documented the use of drones by narco-criminal bands to introduce drugs and cellular telephones into the Bouwer prison complex in Córdoba, with a [December 2025 operation resulting in six detentions](https://minjus.cba.gov.ar/nueva-tecnologia-del-servicio-penitenciario-permitio-desbaratar-una-banda-que-ingresaba-drogas-y-celulares-con-drones-a-bouwer/) and the seizure of drones, narcotics, and prohibited objects. Costa Rica has also [recorded](https://www.teletica.com/multimedia/detienen-drones-que-lanzan-marihuana-cocaina-y-alimentos-a-la-reforma_1242221) attempts to [introduce](https://crhoy.com/nacionales/decomisan-dron-con-droga-y-chips-que-intentaba-ingresar-a-la-reforma/) marijuana, cocaine, and food into the La Reforma prison using drones. The picture that emerges from this mapping is one of uneven but accelerating convergence toward a common operational template in which commercial unmanned aerial systems, modified with improvised explosive devices and enhanced with thermal imaging or first-person view capabilities, are used for surveillance, smuggling, intimidation, and direct attack across nearly every subregion of Latin America. The [assimilation](https://korybko.substack.com/p/the-washington-post-vindicated-svrs) of Ukraine-derived tactics, the recruitment of experienced foreign drone operators, the procurement of fiber-optic and beyond-line-of-sight platforms, and the co-optation of technical expertise from within state institutions together constitute a threat ecosystem that cannot be addressed through isolated national responses. Taken together, the Colombian decision to [create](https://www.heise.de/en/news/Combating-Armed-Groups-Colombia-Unveils-First-Drone-Battalion-10752272.html) a dedicated UAV battalion, the Mexican [agreement](https://thewatch-journal.com/2026/09/21/mexico-u-s-ink-agreement-to-help-mexico-combat-cartel-drones/) with the United States to [access](https://mexicobusiness.news/tech/news/mexico-access-us-army-drone-technology) drone and counter-drone technology, and the Brazilian acquisition of anti-drone equipment by [factions](https://interlira-reports.com/security/rio-invests-against-organized-crime-drones/02/09/2025/) themselves and the [government](https://en.clickpetroleoegas.com.br/governo-brasileiro-surpreende-e-compra-fuzil-especifico-para-acabar-com-o-pcc-gasto-supera-os-r-60-milhoes/) all point to an emerging technological arms race in which the tempo of criminal innovation currently exceeds the rhythm of institutional adaptation. The assessment implications are clear in that intelligence sharing on cartel and gang unmanned aerial system acquisition, operational patterns, and training pipelines must become continuous and cross-border rather than episodic and nationally compartmentalized, and partnerships between intelligence services, law enforcement, and military counterparts on both sides of the United States-Mexico border and across the Andean and Southern Cone theaters could be designed to anticipate criminal capability maturation rather than merely respond to its most visible manifestations. Yet this imperative carries an uncomfortable corollary, however, since the same United States that now seeks to lead regional counter-drone cooperation is itself the principal sponsor of the Ukrainian war effort from which these battlefield-derived skills are migrating into criminal hands, a circularity that Washington’s own internal assessment [acknowledges](https://www.infobae.com/mexico/2026/09/22/los-carteles-mexicanos-quieren-drones-de-guerra-reclutan-a-colombianos-con-experiencia-en-ucrania-segun-wp/) in its warnings about cartel recruitment of Ukraine-trained operators. All-in-all, the criminal drone problem in Latin America is no longer an emerging trend but a consolidated operational reality whose trajectory will be shaped by the diffusion of battlefield-derived expertise and the speed with which states can convert awareness into sustained aerial domain control protocols. \*