# Van Eck phreaking **By:** Wikipedia **Published:** 2004-05-02T23:22:04Z **Source:** [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking) --- **Van Eck phreaking**, also known as **Van Eck radiation**, is a form of [network eavesdropping](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_eavesdropping "Network eavesdropping") in which special equipment is used for a [side-channel attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack "Side-channel attack") on the [electromagnetic emissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_emission "Electromagnetic emission") of electronic devices. While electromagnetic emissions are present in keyboards, printers, and other electronic devices, the most notable use of Van Eck phreaking is in reproducing the contents of a [cathode-ray tube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathode-ray_tube "Cathode-ray tube") (CRT) display at a distance. Information that drives a CRT [video display](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_display "Video display") takes the form of electrical signals in the [RF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_frequency "Radio frequency") range. The electric signal which drives the electron beam is amplified to up to around one hundred volts from [TTL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor%E2%80%93transistor_logic "Transistor–transistor logic") circuitry. The signal leaks out from displays and may be captured by an antenna, and once [synchronization pulses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogue_television_synchronization "Analogue television synchronization") are recreated and mixed in, an ordinary analog television receiver can display the result. These emissions are correlated to the video image being displayed, allowing an attacker to remotely recover the image. While the phenomenon had been known by the United States Government and [Bell Labs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_Labs "Bell Labs") as early as the Second World War, the process received its name after [Wim van Eck](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wim_van_Eck "Wim van Eck") published the first unclassified technical analysis of the security risks of emanations from [computer monitors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_monitor "Computer monitor") in 1985. While [phreaking](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phreaking "Phreaking") is the process of exploiting [telephone networks](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone_network "Telephone network"), the term is used here because of its connection to eavesdropping. ## History Government researchers were already aware of the danger, as [Bell Labs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_Labs "Bell Labs") had noted this vulnerability to secure [teleprinter](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleprinter "Teleprinter") communications during [World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II "World War II") and was able to produce 75% of the plaintext being processed in a secure facility from a distance of 80 feet (24 metres).[\[1\]](#cite_note-Boak-1) Additionally, the NSA published _Tempest Fundamentals, NSA-82-89, NACSIM 5000, National Security Agency_ (Classified) on February 1, 1982. Also, the van Eck technique was successfully demonstrated to non-TEMPEST personnel in [Korea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea "Korea") during the [Korean War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War "Korean War") in the 1950s.\[_[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed "Wikipedia:Citation needed")_\] In 1985, [Wim van Eck](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wim_van_Eck "Wim van Eck") published the first unclassified technical analysis of the security risks of emanations from [computer monitors](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_monitor "Computer monitor").[\[2\]](#cite_note-Greenberg-2)[\[3\]](#cite_note-emr-3) This paper caused some consternation in the security community, which had previously believed that such monitoring was a highly sophisticated attack available only to [governments](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Governments "Governments"); van Eck successfully eavesdropped on a real system, at a range of hundreds of [metres](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metre "Metre"), using just $15 worth of equipment plus a [television](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Television "Television") set. In the paper, Van Eck reports that in February 1985, a successful test of this concept was carried out with the cooperation of the [BBC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBC "BBC"). Using a van filled with electronic equipment and equipped with a [VHF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Very_high_frequency "Very high frequency") [antenna array](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antenna_array_\(electromagnetic\) "Antenna array (electromagnetic)"), they were able to eavesdrop from a "large distance". There is no evidence that the BBC's [TV detector vans](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TV_detector_van "TV detector van") used this technology, although the BBC will not reveal whether or not they are a hoax.[\[4\]](#cite_note-Telegraph-2013-09-27-4) Van Eck phreaking and protecting a CRT display from it was demonstrated on an episode of Tech TV's _[The Screen Savers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Screen_Savers "The Screen Savers")_ on December 18, 2003.[\[5\]](#cite_note-g4tv-5)[\[6\]](#cite_note-Screen_Savers-6) ## Basic principle Information that drives the [video display](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video_display "Video display") takes the form of [high-frequency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_frequency "High frequency") electrical signals. The [oscillation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oscillating "Oscillating") of these [electric currents](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_currents "Electric currents") create [electromagnetic radiation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_radiation "Electromagnetic radiation") in the [RF](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_frequency "Radio frequency") range. These [radio emissions](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_waves "Radio waves") are correlated to the [video](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Video "Video") image being displayed, so, in theory, they can be used to recover the displayed image. In a CRT, the image is generated by an [electron beam](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electron_beam "Electron beam") that sweeps back and forth across the [screen](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_monitor "Computer monitor"). The electron beam excites the [phosphor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phosphor "Phosphor") coating on the glass and causes it to glow. The strength of the beam determines the brightness of individual [pixels](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pixel "Pixel") (see [Cathode-ray tube](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cathode-ray_tube "Cathode-ray tube") for a detailed description). The electric signal that drives the electron beam is amplified to up to around one hundred volts from [TTL](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transistor%E2%80%93transistor_logic "Transistor–transistor logic") circuitry. This high-frequency, high-voltage signal creates electromagnetic radiation that has, according to Van Eck, "a remarkable resemblance to a broadcast TV signal".[\[3\]](#cite_note-emr-3) The signal leaks out from displays and may be captured by an antenna, and once [synchronization pulses](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogue_television_synchronization "Analogue television synchronization") are recreated and mixed in, an ordinary analog television receiver can display the result. The synchronization pulses can be recreated either through manual adjustment or by processing the signals emitted by [electromagnetic coils](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_coil "Electromagnetic coil") as they deflect the CRT's electron beam back and forth.[\[3\]](#cite_note-emr-3) ## Equipment A tailored access battery is a special laptop battery with Van Eck Phreaking electronics and power-side band encryption cracking electronics built into its casing, in combination with a remote transceiver. This allows for quick installation and removal of a spying device by simply swapping the battery.[\[7\]](#cite_note-FDES-7) ## Potential risks Van Eck phreaking might be used to compromise the secrecy of the votes in an election using [electronic voting](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting "Electronic voting"). This caused the Dutch government to ban the use of NewVote [computer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer "Computer") [voting machines](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_machine "Voting machine") manufactured by SDU in the [2006 national elections](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_general_election,_2006 "Dutch general election, 2006"), under the belief that ballot information might not be kept secret.[\[8\]](#cite_note-Herald_tribune-8)[\[9\]](#cite_note-heise-9) In a 2009 test of electronic voting systems in Brazil, Van Eck phreaking was used to successfully compromise ballot secrecy as a proof of concept.[\[10\]](#cite_note-slashdot-10) In January 2015, the Airhopper project from [Georgia Institute of Technology](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Institute_of_Technology "Georgia Institute of Technology"), United States demonstrated (at [Ben Gurion University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Gurion_University "Ben Gurion University"), Israel) the use of Van Eck Phreaking to enable a keylogger to communicate, through video signal manipulation, keys pressed on the keyboard of a standard PC, to a program running on an [Android](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\) "Android (operating system)") cellphone with an earbud radio antenna. Such attacks could be used to exfiltrate data from [air-gapped](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_\(networking\) "Air gap (networking)") systems.[\[11\]](#cite_note-TechRepublic-11)[\[12\]](#cite_note-Airhopper-12)[\[13\]](#cite_note-demonstration_video-13) ## Further research In April 2004, academic research revealed that flat panel and laptop displays are also vulnerable to electromagnetic eavesdropping. The required equipment for espionage was constructed in a university lab for less than US$2000.[\[14\]](#cite_note-Kuhn2004-14) [Markus Kuhn](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markus_Kuhn_\(computer_scientist\) "Markus Kuhn (computer scientist)") has discovered several low-cost techniques for reducing the chances that emanations from computer displays can be monitored remotely.[\[15\]](#cite_note-Kuhn577-15) With CRT displays and [analog](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog_signal "Analog signal") video cables, filtering out [high-frequency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High-frequency "High-frequency") components from [fonts](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typeface "Typeface") before rendering them on a computer screen will attenuate the energy at which text characters are broadcast. With modern [flat panel displays](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flat_panel_display "Flat panel display"), the high-speed digital [serial interface](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_interface "Serial interface") ([DVI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Visual_Interface "Digital Visual Interface")) cables from the [graphics controller](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphics_controller "Graphics controller") are a main source of compromising emanations. Adding random [noise](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noise_\(signal_processing\) "Noise (signal processing)") to the [least significant bits](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Least_significant_bit "Least significant bit") of pixel values may render the emanations from flat-panel displays unintelligible to eavesdroppers but is not a secure method. Since DVI uses a [certain bit code scheme](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8b/10b_encoding "8b/10b encoding") that tries to transport a balanced signal of 0 bits and 1 bits, there may not be much difference between two pixel colors that differ very much in their color or intensity. The emanations can differ drastically even if only the last bit of a pixel's color is changed. The signal received by the eavesdropper also depends on the frequency where the emanations are detected. The signal can be received on many frequencies at once and each frequency's signal differs in [contrast](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contrast_\(vision\) "Contrast (vision)") and [brightness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brightness "Brightness") related to a certain color on the screen. Usually, the technique of smothering the RED signal with noise is not effective unless the power of the noise is sufficient to drive the eavesdropper's receiver into [saturation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saturation_\(telecommunications\)?action=edit&redlink=1 "Saturation (telecommunications) (page does not exist)") thus overwhelming the receiver input. ## References 1. [↑](#cite_ref-Boak_1-0) ["A History of U.S. Communications Security (Volumes I and II)"; David G. Boak Lectures"](https://www.governmentattic.org/2docs/Hist_US_COMSEC_Boak_NSA_1973.pdf) (PDF). _National Security Agency_. 1973. p. 90. 2. [↑](#cite_ref-Greenberg_2-0) Greenberg, Andy (21 June 2020). ["Hacker Lexicon: What Is a Side Channel Attack?"](https://www.wired.com/story/what-is-side-channel-attack/). _[Wired](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wired_\(magazine\) "Wired (magazine)")_. 3. [1](#cite_ref-emr_3-0) [2](#cite_ref-emr_3-1) [3](#cite_ref-emr_3-2) Van Eck, Wim (1985). ["Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?"](http://www.tscm.com/vaneck85.pdf) (PDF). _Computers & Security_. **4** (4): 269–286\. [doi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doi_\(identifier\) "Doi (identifier)"):[10.1016/0167-4048(85)90046-X](https://doi.org/10.1016%2F0167-4048%2885%2990046-X). 4. [↑](#cite_ref-Telegraph-2013-09-27_4-0) Carter, Claire (27 September 2013). ["Myth of the TV detector van?"](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/bbc/10340804/Myth-of-the-TV-detector-van.html). _The Daily Telegraph_. Retrieved 27 September 2015. 5. [↑](#cite_ref-g4tv_5-0) ["Van Eck Phreaking"](https://web.archive.org/web/20130310130245/http://www.g4tv.com/videos/8041/van-eck-phreaking/). Archived from [the original](http://g4tv.com/videos/8041/van-eck-phreaking) on 2013-03-10. Retrieved 2010-01-14. 6. [↑](#cite_ref-Screen_Savers_6-0) [The Screen Savers: Dark Tip – Van Eck Phreaking](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozl8_8wzEVI) 7. [↑](#cite_ref-FDES_7-0) White paper, FDES institute, 1996, page 12. 8. [↑](#cite_ref-Herald_tribune_8-0) [Dutch government scraps plans to use voting computers in 35 cities including Amsterdam (Herald tribune, 30. October 2006)](http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/30/europe/EU_GEN_Netherlands_Voting_Machines.php) 9. [↑](#cite_ref-heise_9-0) [Use of SDU voting computers banned during Dutch general elections](http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302) [Archived](https://web.archive.org/web/20080923142636/http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/80302) 2008-09-23 at the [Wayback Machine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayback_Machine "Wayback Machine") (Heise, October 31. 2006) 10. [↑](#cite_ref-slashdot_10-0) ["Brazilian Breaks Secrecy of Brazil's E-Voting Machines With Van Eck Phreaking"](http://yro.slashdot.org/story/09/11/22/027229/Brazilian-Breaks-Secrecy-of-Brazils-E-Voting-Machines-With-Van-Eck-Phreaking). _Slashdot_. November 21, 2009. 11. [↑](#cite_ref-TechRepublic_11-0) [Air-gapped computers are no longer secure, TechRepublic, January 26, 2015](https://www.yahoo.com/tech/s/air-gapped-computers-no-longer-183708658.html) 12. [↑](#cite_ref-Airhopper_12-0) [Original Whitepaper](https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.0237) 13. [↑](#cite_ref-demonstration_video_13-0) [Airhopper demonstration video, Ben Gurion University](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gtuEdflUA0) 14. [↑](#cite_ref-Kuhn2004_14-0) Kuhn, M.G. (2004). ["Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks of Flat-Panel Displays"](http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-fpd.pdf) (PDF). _4th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies_: 23–25. 15. [↑](#cite_ref-Kuhn577_15-0) [Kuhn, Markus G.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markus_Kuhn_\(computer_scientist\) "Markus Kuhn (computer scientist)") (December 2003). ["Compromising emanations: eavesdropping risks of computer displays"](http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-577.pdf) (PDF). _Technical Report_ (577). [ISSN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISSN_\(identifier\) "ISSN (identifier)") [1476-2986](https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1476-2986). UCAM-CL-TR-577. Retrieved 2010-10-29.