# AI and the Decision to Go to War **By:** Ashley Deeks **Source:** [Cambridge Core](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/themed-issues/ai-and-the-decision-to-go-to-war) --- # Cambridge Forum on AI: Law and Governance ## AI and the Decision to Go to War Guest-edited by Toni Erskine, _Australian National University, Australia_ and Steven E. Miller, _Harvard University, USA._ When it comes to AI-enabled systems employed in the military domain, the attention of both policymakers and scholars has been overwhelmingly directed towards their impact on the _conduct_ of war. The predominant focus to date has been on the use of “lethal autonomous weapons systems” (LAWS) and decision-support systems that rely on big data analytics and machine learning to recommend targets – _after_ the decision to engage in armed conflict has been taken. By contrast, this Themed Issue aims to shift our gaze from the impact of AI on the battlefield to the relatively neglected prospect of AI in the war-room. In other words, its object of analysis is the anticipated increasing influence of AI-enabled systems on state-level decision making on the _resort_ to war.  If we look at the proliferation of AI-driven systems to aid decision making in a host of other realms, we have reason to predict that such systems will also steadily infiltrate deliberations over the very initiation of war. There are two general ways that current AI-enabled technologies could impact resort-to-force decision making. This could occur through AI-enabled decision-support systems that would inform (and ideally enhance) human deliberations over whether and when to wage war. Alternatively, this could conceivably be the result of various manifestations of automated self-defence, whereby AI-driven systems would independently calculate and carry out courses of action that could constitute the resort to war – for example, in the context of potentially volatile interactions between autonomous underwater or aerial vehicles leading to unintended escalations, or automated responses either to cyber-attacks or (more alarmingly and hopefully hypothetically) to indications of a nuclear strike. The aim of the fourteen research articles that comprise this Themed Issue is: 1) to analyse the risks and opportunities associated with employing AI-enabled systems to guide decisions on war initiation in either of these two ways; and 2) to propose means of mitigating these risks and enhancing these opportunities. In pursuit of this aim, the contributors draw on their diverse disciplinary backgrounds in political science, international relations (IR), physics, law, computer science, engineering, sociology, philosophy, and mathematics. Together, they confront the legal, ethical, sociotechnical, political, and geopolitical challenges that will accompany AI into the war-room. Watch an introduction to the themed issue from Guest Editor Toni Erskine. ![Video introduction thumbnail](https://img.youtube.com/vi/mQqGsBWyB4w/hqdefault.jpg) Read Toni Erskine and Steven E. Miller’s Introductory Research Article ### [Computer says, “war”: AI and resort-to-force decision making in a context of rapid change and global uncertainty](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/computer-says-war-ai-and-resorttoforce-decision-making-in-a-context-of-rapid-change-and-global-uncertainty/CDB36A8431353395A740F78A3EFC0732) [Toni Erskine](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Toni%20Erskine&eventCode=SE-AU), [Steven E. Miller](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Steven%20E.%20Miller&eventCode=SE-AU) [Cambridge Forum on AI: Law and Governance](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance) , [Volume 1](https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/0CC897AF6D6A397815618F0183BDB61C) (2025) - ### [State responsibility for AI mistakes in the resort to force](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/state-responsibility-for-ai-mistakes-in-the-resort-to-force/24B4A9DB743A53BCABBA67E536E9C24E) - - [AI and the Decision to Go to War](https://cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/AI_AND_THE_DECISION_TO_GO_TO_WAR/type/BESPOKE_COLLECTION) - In a resort-to-force setting, what standard of care must a state follow when using AI to avoid international responsibility for a wrongful act? This article develops three scenarios based around a state-owned autonomous system that erroneously resorts to force (the Flawed AI System, the Poisoned AI System, and the Competitive AI System). It reveals that although we know what the substantive _jus ad bellum_ and international humanitarian law rules are, international law says very little about the standards of care to which a state must adhere to meet its substantive obligations under those bodies of law. The article argues that the baseline standard of care under the _jus ad bellum_ today requires a state to act in good faith and in an objectively reasonable way, and it describes measures states should consider taking to meet that standard when deploying AI or autonomy in their resort-to-force systems. It concludes by explaining how clarifying this standard of care will benefit states by reducing the chance of unintended conflicts. - ### [Architectures of AI: Tech power broking war?](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/architectures-of-ai-tech-power-broking-war/90CEC9E0D9E88CCD48301228A33F2335) - This article investigates the profound impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data on political and military deliberations concerning the decision to wage war. By conceptualising AI as part of a broader, interconnected technology ecosystem – encompassing data, connectivity, energy, compute capacity and workforce – the article introduces the notion of “architectures of AI” to describe the underlying infrastructure shaping contemporary security and sovereignty. It demonstrates how these architectures concentrate power within a select number of technology companies, which increasingly function as national security actors capable of influencing state decisions on the resort to force. The article identifies three critical factors that collectively alter the calculus of war: (i) the concentration of power across the architectures of AI, (ii) the diffusion of national security decision making, and (iii) the role of AI in shaping public opinion. It argues that, as technology companies amass unprecedented control over digital infrastructure and information flows, most nation states – particularly smaller or less technologically advanced ones – experience diminished autonomy in decisions to use force. The article specifically examines how technology companies can coerce, influence or incentivise the resort-to-force decision making of smaller states, thereby challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty and international security. - ### [AI-optimized violence and the suffocation of moral and political wisdom](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/aioptimized-violence-and-the-suffocation-of-moral-and-political-wisdom/9B3473BBF8E35674C33A1B3A338466BC) - In this article, I consider the potential integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into resort-to-force decision-making from a Just War perspective. I evaluate two principles from this tradition: (1) the _jus ad bellum_ principle of “reasonable prospect of success” and (2) the more recent _jus ad vim_ principle of “the probability of escalation.” More than any other principles of Just War, these prudential standards seem amenable to the probabilistic reasoning of AI-driven systems. I argue, however, that this optimism in the potential of AI-optimized decision-making is largely misplaced. We need to cultivate a tragic sensibility in war – a recognition of the inescapable limits of foresight, the permanence of uncertainty and the dangers of unconstrained ambition. False confidence in the efficacy of these systems will blind us to their technical limits. It will also, more seriously, obscure the deleterious impact of AI on the _process_ of resort-to-force decision-making; its potential to suffocate the moral and political wisdom so essential to the responsible exercise of violence on the international stage. - ### [AI, trust, and the war room: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in the US military](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/ai-trust-and-the-war-room-evidence-from-a-conjoint-experiment-in-the-us-military/B0AC82CE273D8785D8ABF980D5BE441D) - What shapes military attitudes of trust in artificial intelligence (AI) used for strategic-level decision-making? When used in concert with humans, AI is thought to help militaries maintain lethal overmatch of adversaries on the battlefield as well as optimize leaders’ decision-making in the war room. Yet it is unclear what shapes servicemembers’ trust in AI used for strategic-level decision-making. In October 2023, I administered a conjoint survey experiment among an elite sample of officers attending the US Army and Naval War Colleges to assess what shapes servicemembers’ trust in AI used for strategic-level deliberations. I find that their trust in AI used for strategic-level deliberations is shaped by a tightly calibrated set of technical, operational, and oversight considerations. These results provide the first experimental evidence for military attitudes of trust toward AI during crisis escalation, which have important research, policy, and modernization implications. - ### [Waltzing into uncertainty: AI in nuclear decision making and the challenge of divergent deterrence logics](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/waltzing-into-uncertainty-ai-in-nuclear-decision-making-and-the-challenge-of-divergent-deterrence-logics/F9AC25E21116B92D8956D70040A84CC1) - This article critically examines the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear decision-making processes and its implications for deterrence strategies in the Third Nuclear Age. While realist deterrence logic assumes that the threat of mutual destruction compels rational actors to act cautiously, AI disrupts this by adding speed, opacity and algorithmic biases to decision-making processes. The article focuses on the case of Russia to explore how different understandings of deterrence among nuclear powers could increase the risk of misperceptions and inadvertent escalation in an AI-influenced strategic environment. I argue that AI does not operate in a conceptual vacuum: the effects of its integration depend on the strategic assumptions guiding its use. As such, divergent interpretations of deterrence may render AI-supported decision making more unpredictable, particularly in high-stakes nuclear contexts. I also consider how these risks intersect with broader arms race dynamics. Specifically, the pursuit of AI-enabled capabilities by global powers is not only accelerating military modernisation but also intensifying the security dilemma, as each side fears falling behind. In light of these challenges, this article calls for greater attention to conceptual divergence in deterrence thinking, alongside transparency protocols and confidence-building measures aimed at mitigating misunderstandings and promoting stability in an increasingly automated military landscape. - ### [Augmenting military decision making with artificial intelligence](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/augmenting-military-decision-making-with-artificial-intelligence/73C24E5BE362CA168FF8DB86D49F8CDF) - As artificial intelligence (AI) plays an increasing role in operations on battlefields, we should consider how it might also be used in the strategic decisions that happen before a military operation even occurs. One such critical decision that nations must make is whether to use armed force. There is often only a small group of political and military leaders involved in this decision-making process. Top military commanders typically play an important role in these deliberations around whether to use force. These commanders are relied upon for their expertise. They provide information and guidance about the military options available and the potential outcomes of those actions. This article asks two questions: (1) how do military commanders make these judgements? and (2) how might AI be used to assist them in their critical decision-making processes? To address the first, I draw on existing literature from psychology, philosophy, and military organizations themselves. To address the second, I explore how AI might augment the judgment and reasoning of commanders deliberating over the use of force. While there is already a robust body of work exploring the risks of using AI-driven decision-support systems, this article focuses on the opportunities, while keeping those risks firmly in view. - ### [AI governance for military decision-making: A proposal for managing complexity](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/ai-governance-for-military-decisionmaking-a-proposal-for-managing-complexity/E7C9191E43799181AA72F5835618A45D) - Military decision-making institutions face new challenges and opportunities from increasing artificial intelligence (AI) integration. Military AI adoption is incentivized by competitive pressures and expanding national security needs; thus, we can expect increased complexity due to AI proliferation. Governing this complexity is urgent but lacks clear precedents. This discussion critically re-examines key concerns that AI integration into resort-to-force decision-making organizations introduces. Beside concerns, this article draws attention to new, positive affordances that AI proliferation may introduce. I then propose a minimal AI governance standard framework, adapting private sector insights to the defence context. I argue that adopting AI governance standards (e.g., based on this framework) can foster an organizational culture of accountability, combining technical know-how with the cultivated judgment needed to navigate contested governance concepts. Finally, I hypothesize some strategic implications of the adoption of AI governance programmes by military institutions. - ### [Upskilling human actors against AI automation bias in strategic decision making on the resort to force](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/upskilling-human-actors-against-ai-automation-bias-in-strategic-decision-making-on-the-resort-to-force/75804737BEF096498E05E3EB824A2877) - The use of artificial intelligence-driven decision-support systems (AI DSS) to assist human calculations on the resort to military force has raised concerns that automation bias may displace human judgments. Such fears are compounded by the complexities and pathologies of organisational decision making. Discussions of AI often revolve around better _training AI models_ with more copious amounts of technical data, but this article poses research questions that shift the focus to a human-centric and institutional approach. How can governments better _train human decision makers_ and restructure _institutional settings_ within which humans operate to minimise the risks of automation bias and deskilling? This article begins by exploring how governments have invested in AI literacy education and capacity-building. Second, it demonstrates how the need to question groupthink and challenge assumptions in decision making becomes even more relevant as the use of AI DSS become more prevalent. Third, human decision makers operate within institutional structures with internal audit trails and organisational cultures, inter-agency networks and intelligence-sharing partnerships that may mitigate the risks of human deskilling. Bolstering these three inter-locking, mutually reinforcing elements of education, challenge functions and institutions offers some avenues for managing automation bias in decisions on the resort to force. - ### [Integrators at war: Mediating in AI-assisted resort-to-force decisions](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/integrators-at-war-mediating-in-aiassisted-resorttoforce-decisions/D176832403A3BE49069FD0E86038D989) - The integration of AI systems into the military domain is changing the way war-related decisions are made. It binds together three disparate groups of actors – developers, integrators, and users – and creates a relationship between these groups and the machine, embedded in the (pre-)existing organisational and system structures. In this article, we focus on the important, but often neglected, group of integrators within such a socio-technical system. In complex human–machine configurations, integrators carry responsibility for linking the disparate groups of developers and users in the political and military system. To act as the mediating group requires a deep understanding of the other groups’ activities, perspectives and norms. We thus ask which challenges and shortcomings emerge from integrating AI systems into resort-to-force (RtF) decision-making processes, and how to address them. To answer this, we proceed in three steps. First, we conceptualise the relationship between different groups of actors and AI systems as a socio-technical system. Second, we identify challenges within such systems for human–machine teaming in RtF decisions. We focus on challenges that arise (a) from the technology itself, (b) from the integrators’ role in the socio-technical system and (c) from the human–machine interaction. Third, we provide policy recommendations to address these shortcomings when integrating AI systems into RtF decision-making structures. - ### [Technology and tactics: The intersection of safety, AI, and the resort to force](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/technology-and-tactics-the-intersection-of-safety-ai-and-the-resort-to-force/57077A064E234AC12C248A8AA42E9753) - Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly being incorporated into military decision making in the form of decision-support systems (DSS). Such systems may offer data-informed suggestions to those responsible for making decisions regarding the resort to force. While DSS are not new in military contexts, we argue that AI-enabled DSS are sources of additional complexity in an already complex resort-to-force decision-making process that – by its very nature – presents the dual potential for both strategic stability and harm. We present three categories of complexity relevant to AI – interactive and nonlinear complexity, software complexity, and dynamic complexity – and examine how such categories introduce or exacerbate risks in resort-to-force decision-making. We then provide policy recommendations that aim to mitigate some of these risks in practice. - ### [“Borgs in the org” and the decision to wage war: The impact of AI on institutional learning and the exercise of restraint](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/borgs-in-the-org-and-the-decision-to-wage-war-the-impact-of-ai-on-institutional-learning-and-the-exercise-of-restraint/00D27DE0E037801E1C381C125B88580B) - In this article, we maintain that the anticipated integration of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems into state-level decision making over whether and when to wage war will be accompanied by a hitherto neglected risk. Namely, the incorporation of such systems will engender subtle but significant changes to the state’s deliberative and organisational structures, its culture, and its capacities – and in ways that could undermine its adherence to international norms of restraint. In offering this provocation, we argue that the gradual proliferation and embeddedness of AI-enabled decision-support systems within the state – what we call the ‘phenomenon of “Borgs in the org”’ – will lead to four significant changes that, together, threaten to diminish the state’s crucial capacity for ‘institutional learning’. Specifically, the state’s reliance on AI-enabled decision-support systems in deliberations over war initiation will invite: (i) disrupted deliberative structures and chains of command; (ii) the occlusion of crucial steps in decision-making processes; (iii) institutionalised deference to computer-generated outputs; and (iv) future plans and trajectories that are overdetermined by past policies and actions. The resulting ‘institutional atrophy’ could, in turn, weaken the state’s responsiveness to external social cues and censure, thereby making the state less likely to engage with, internalise, and adhere to evolving international norms of restraint. As a collateral effect, this weakening could contribute to the decay of these norms themselves if such institutional atrophy were to become widespread within the society of states. - ### [Certainty and algorithmic accountability in the decision to go to war: Lessons from evidentiary approaches in international criminal law](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/certainty-and-algorithmic-accountability-in-the-decision-to-go-to-war-lessons-from-evidentiary-approaches-in-international-criminal-law/0CB81F0C8E2D67FD15685F8AE44EFB9A) - - [AI and the Decision to Go to War](https://cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/AI_AND_THE_DECISION_TO_GO_TO_WAR/type/BESPOKE_COLLECTION) - In Western democracies the decision to go to war is made in ways that ensure decision-makers can be held accountable. In particular, bureaucracies rely on the production of a range of documents such as records of meetings to ensure accountability. Inserting AI into the decision-making process means finding ways to make sure that AI can also be held accountable for decisions to resort to force. But problems of accountability arise in this context because AI does not produce the type of documents associated with bureaucratic accountability: it is this gap in documentary capacity which is at the core of the troubling search for accountable AI in the context of the decision to go to war. This paper argues that the search for accountable AI is essentially an attempt to solve problems of epistemic uncertainty via documentation. The paper argues that accountability can be achieved in other ways. It adopts the example of new forms of evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) to show that epistemic uncertainty can be resolved and accountability apportioned without absolute epistemic certainty and without documentation in the sense commonly associated with accountability in a bureaucratic context. - ### [Institutionalizing proxy responsibility: AI oversight bodies and resort-to-force decision making](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/institutionalizing-proxy-responsibility-ai-oversight-bodies-and-resorttoforce-decision-making/E47BA41B373C636308D51AF3162C2932) - - [AI and the Decision to Go to War](https://cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/AI_AND_THE_DECISION_TO_GO_TO_WAR/type/BESPOKE_COLLECTION) - Integrating AI into military decision processes on the resort to force raises new moral challenges. A key question is: How can we assign responsibility in cases where AI systems shape the decision-making process on the resort to force? AI systems do not qualify as moral agents, and due to their opaqueness and the “problem of many hands,” responsibility for decisions made by a machine cannot be attributed to any one individual. To address this socio-technical responsibility gap, I suggest establishing “proxy responsibility” relations. Proxy responsibility means that an actor takes responsibility for the decisions made by another actor or synthetic agent who cannot be attributed with responsibility for their decisions. This article discusses the option to integrate an AI oversight body to establish proxy responsibility relations within decision-making processes regarding the resort to force. I argue that integrating an AI oversight body creates the preconditions necessary for attributing proxy responsibility to individuals. - ### [Computer says, “war”: AI and resort-to-force decision making in a context of rapid change and global uncertainty](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance/article/computer-says-war-ai-and-resorttoforce-decision-making-in-a-context-of-rapid-change-and-global-uncertainty/CDB36A8431353395A740F78A3EFC0732) - - [AI and the Decision to Go to War](https://cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/AI_AND_THE_DECISION_TO_GO_TO_WAR/type/BESPOKE_COLLECTION) - Journal: [Cambridge Forum on AI: Law and Governance](https://cambridge.org/core/journals/cambridge-forum-on-ai-law-and-governance) / [Volume 1](https://cambridge.org/core/product/0CC897AF6D6A397815618F0183BDB61C) / 2025 Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 January 2026, e47 - This article prefaces our Special Issue on “AI and the Decision to Go to War.” We begin by introducing the prospect of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems increasingly infiltrating state-level decision making on the resort to force, clarifying that our focus is on _existing_ technologies, and outlining the two general ways that this can conceivably occur: through automated self-defense and AI-enabled decision-support systems. We then highlight recent, on-going developments that create a backdrop of rapid change and global uncertainty against which AI-enabled systems will inform such deliberations: (i) the widespread tendency to misperceive the latest AI-enabled technologies as increasingly “human”; (ii) the changing role of “Big Tech” in the global competition over military applications of AI; (iii) a conspicuous blind spot in current discussions surrounding international regulation; and (iv) the emerging reality of an AI-nuclear weapons nexus. We suggest that each factor will affect the trajectory of AI-informed war initiation and must be addressed as scholars and policymakers determine how best to prepare for, direct, and respond to this anticipated change. Finally, turning to the pressing legal, ethical, sociotechnical, political, and geopolitical challenges that will accompany this transformation, we revisit four “complications” that have framed the broader project from which this Special Issue has emerged. Within this framework, we preview the other 13 multidisciplinary research articles that make up this collection. Together, these articles explore the risks and opportunities that will follow AI into the war-room.